When World War I began, it was generally assumed that the war would be short, successful and relatively dieap. It turned out to be long, generally unsuccessful, and expensive. How could European leaders so seriously misapprehend the implications of their decisions for war? Was a short war likely but precluded by chance events? Or was it unlikely under existing conditions? The answers to these questions suggest insights into the crisis whidi eventuated in war, into the subsequent course of the war and into the nature of modern warfare itself. * * * Great power behavior during the early months of the war can be understood best in terms of prewar policies. These policies collided in the July crisis. All the powers sought diplomatic victory whidi proved impossible because diplomatic defeat was unacceptable to any of the powers. All the powers therefore made a negative choice for war in the sense that it seemed less undesirable than diplomatic defeat. But positive reasons for war were also perceived in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, St. Petersburg and Belgrade (although probably not in London and Brussels). War might achieve the objectives which had eluded diplomacy during the July crisis. Germany sought not only to shore up its alliance with AustriaHungary but also to shatter the Franco-Russian alliance. Austria-Hungary sought not only to preserve its own existence but also to force acceptance of its predominance in the Balkans on Russia. Russia sought to preserve its alliance with France and to make Austria-Hungary accept its sphere of influence in the Balkans. France sought to preserve its alliance with Russia. Britain sought to retain its free hand for colonial activity by preserving the continental balance. Probably all the continental powers had even more ambitious aspirations which implied a revolution of the state system. These aspirations notwithstanding, probably none of the powers began the war with the specific intention of destroying the system and all envisaged only reconstruction in their favor rather than revolution. Although the means had been changed from diplomacy to war, the ends remained basically prewar. War seemed merely policy by other means. War could be perceived in this way because of the prevailing view that the war would be short. Perhaps even more significant than the prevalence of this view was the fact that those who expressed the contrary view did little to prepare for it. This was probably due to the assumption that Europe's political and economic level of development made such preparations either unnecessary or impossible The assumption of a short war dominated German strategy. It had not always been so. Concern that the next war would be long increasingly permeated the elder Moltke's thinking until he predicted in his last speech that the next war would last seven or even thirty years. At the other end of the political spectrum, Engels shared this view, though he estimated more accurately -three or four years. The turning point occurred with SdiliefFen, who assumed that a lengthy conflict was impossible "in an age in which the existence of nations is based on the uninterrupted progress of trade and commerce. ... A strategy of exhaustion is impossible when the maintenance of millions necessitates the expenditure of billions". Sdilieffen's successor, the younger Moltke, was characteristically contradictory, sometimes predicting that the war would be long, at other times short. But, however his predictions varied, his plans remained consistent -namely, based on Sdilieffen's strategy. The short war assumption seems generally to have been shared by the German officer corps. By implication, a short and victorious war was assumed in discussions of the possibility of a preventive war. Germany's apparent military success during the first weeks of the war reinforced these assumptions. Though shaken by the Marne setback in September, these assumptions revived again during October but were thoroughly shaken by the end of 1914 »
* * *
Great power behavior during the early months of the war can be understood best in terms of prewar policies. These policies collided in the July crisis. All the powers sought diplomatic victory whidi proved impossible because diplomatic defeat was unacceptable to any of the powers. All the powers therefore made a negative choice for war in the sense that it seemed less undesirable than diplomatic defeat. But positive reasons for war were also perceived in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, St. Petersburg and Belgrade (although probably not in London and Brussels). War might achieve the objectives which had eluded diplomacy during the July crisis. Germany sought not only to shore up its alliance with AustriaHungary but also to shatter the Franco-Russian alliance. Austria-Hungary sought not only to preserve its own existence but also to force acceptance of its predominance in the Balkans on Russia. Russia sought to preserve its alliance with France and to make Austria-Hungary accept its sphere of influence in the Balkans. France sought to preserve its alliance with Russia. Britain sought to retain its free hand for colonial activity by preserving the continental balance. Probably all the continental powers had even more ambitious aspirations which implied a revolution of the state system. These aspirations notwithstanding, probably none of the powers began the war with the specific intention of destroying the system and all envisaged only reconstruction in their favor rather than revolution. Although the means had been changed from diplomacy to war, the ends remained basically prewar. War seemed merely policy by other means. War could be perceived in this way because of the prevailing view that the war would be short. Perhaps even more significant than the prevalence of this view was the fact that those who expressed the contrary view did little to prepare for it. This was probably due to the assumption that Europe's political and economic level of development made such preparations either unnecessary or impossible 1 The limits of space make possible only a general survey of the literature on this question. For the view that a short war was expected by most Europeans, see, Β. H. Liddell Hart: The Real War, 1914 -1918 , Boston and Toronto 1930 ; J. P. T. Bury: France, 1814 -1940 , New York 1962 ; A. J. P. Taylor: The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848 -1918 , Oxford 1954 the generals, hopes for a rapid victory revived among civilian leaders in October but were shattered by the end of the year s .
To the extent that they expressed themselves, German financeers and industrialists seem to have shared the government's assumption that the war would be short. That they did so is probably due in large measure to the government's efforts and attitudes. Although Schlieft en based his assumption of a short war on economic and political considerations, he virtually ignored them in his planning for war, as did his successor, the younger Moltke. Although some efforts were made before the war to foresee the economic implications of a conflict, little was accomplished, largely because it was assumed that a short war would make it unnecessary. Consistent with this assumption, factory and farm were subordinated to the front: industrial and agricultural labor was mobilized when the war began. Some industrialists and financeers seem to have doubted that the war would end quickly, in particular, that England would accept the defeat of France. But most seem to have expected the conflict to end quickly, indeed, perhaps too quickly, and began agitating against a "premature peace" 4 . German politicians and the leaders of the Bundesstaaten shared these views. To the extent that some conservatives felt a war would reinforced the status quo, they probably assumed a short, successful conflict. This assumption that a brief and victorious war would strengthen the conservative system was expressed by a Socialist member of the Reichstag in August, when victory seemed imminent. Other members of the Reichstag accepted the view that a long war was economically unfeasible. The unanimous acceptance of the political truce implied by the Burgfrieden was probably based in part on the assumption that it would be temporary and that politics would be resumed when the Reichstag reconvened in December, by which time the war was expected to be over. This view was certainly encouraged by the Kaiser's assurance that victory would be won "before the leaves fall". In September and October, discussions occurred between the government and politicans (particularly of the left) on the post-war resolution of domestic political problems. Since they expected victory imminently, several leaders of Bundesstaaten put in their bids for war aims before Prussia took everything. The military setbacks of the autumn caused the government and generals to fear that the German people's hopes for a rapid victory would be so shattered that they might not be willing to continue the war. 1914 -1918 , Göttingen 1963 The assumption that war would be short was perhaps a precondition for decisions to resort to war in pursuit of prewar objectives. If war were assumed to be long, revolutionary and advantageous to no one, it would have been too high a price to pay for any objectives. Only if war were assumed to be short, compatible with the state system and productive to the victor would these objectives be worth pursuing by war. The short war assumption was therefore a necessary precondition for decisions to resort to war. It would be conservative in the diplomatic sense of perpetuating the great power system and in the domestic sense of preserving the power of the ruling classes (at least in the victorious states). In short, Bismarck not Napoleon was the generally accepted model. The assumption of a short war was not only the justification for resorting to war but also the starting point for the strategy, diplomacy and domestic politics of all the belligerents during the first months of the war. It would prove the war's greatest illusion.
Military plans are forward-looking in so far as they prescribe future actions. Conversely, actions based on such plans are backward-looking. Since it was based on such a previously established plan, German strategy during the early months of the war was determined by prewar assumptions. The blueprint for a quick German victory was the Sdilieffen plan. Sdilieffen started from the assumption that Germany (and Austria-Hungary) would face a Russo-French (and probably British) alliance in war. Germany could win only if the war were short. A quick victory was possible only if the enemy's forces were rapidly annihilated. Considerations of space for withdrawal and speed of mobilization made France seem more susceptible than Russia to rapid defeat. Frendi defeat was possible only if the main Frendi army could be encircled. Encirclement necessitated both German superiority and terrain for maneuver. Thus, Sdilieffen decided upon a concentration of German forces on the northern flank facing France. To do so, he reduced to a minimum his forces on the eastern front against Russia and on the southern front facing France. The risks seemed justified because he assumed that the alternative of short-term security would preclude rapid success and thus only insure long-term failure 10 .
Although the Germans could determine the disposition of their own forces, success depended on several conditions beyond their control. Germany could win a quick war only if Russian power remained ineffective long enough for Germany to defeat France. But only the Russians could decide whether their forces remained inactive. German success was also dependent on Frendi strategy. The Frendi army could be encircled quickly only if it were concentrated and advanced rapidly, not if it were divided, withdrawn or advanced slowly. But only French decisions would determine Frendi dispositions. Finally, German success was also conditional on Frendi policy, namely on a Frendi decision to surrender immediately after defeat. Although this was hypothetically possible, the example of Frendi behavior in 1870-1 made it unlikely. France had surrendered in 1871 not because it had been defeated but because it could not find allies with whidi to continue the war. In short, diplomatic isolation not military defeat had been the critical consideration. The limits of space necessitate a relatively narrow focus in the present article on the primary concerns of German leaders. But doing so is justified in terms of the behaviour of German leaders. Once the German people had demonstrated that they would support the war, domestic political questions were postponed and German leaders concentrated their attention on military and diplomatic considerations. Since they expected the war to be decided on land, naval questions will not be discussed in the present article.
would have been unnecessary. But war made the Schlieffen plan necessary. Thus, it was based on a contradiction. It might have succeeded when it was unnecessary but was necessary when it was unlikely to succeed. Although political rather than military considerations would probably determine French decisions, military events were not unimportant. German military success depended in part on French strategy. A paradoxical result of revived Frendi self-confidence on the eve of war was its encouragement of a strategy whidi increased the possibility of Frendi defeat. The French blueprint for victory was Plan XVII. Like the Schlieffen plan, it was based on the assumptions that war would be short and victory required an offensive. The possibility of meeting the German advance through Belgium was considered but rejected not only because of Anglo-Belgian resistance but also because it implied military stalemate. Instead, Frendi strategists sought victory by exploiting the diversion of the main German force in Belgium to break through the German center. Thus, Frendi and German strategies reinforced each other. They differed, however, in formulation. Whereas the Schlieffen plan stipulated its ultimate objective (annihilation of the Frendi army), Plan XVII did not. The Frendi breakthrough and increasing Russian pressure would presumably cause the Germans to renounce their offensive, withdraw in confusion and surrender at the prospect of a long, unsuccessful war. In short, Plan XVII like the Sdilieffen plan assumed military events would determine political decisions, namely, defeat would cause surrender. But subsequent events contradicted this assumption. When quick victory eluded them by the end of 1914, the Germans did not opt for compromise in preference to a long war. Germany might have concluded peace after defeat if it had been weaker and/or diplomatically isolated by the collapse of its alliance with Austria-Hungary during the July crisis. But, if it had been weaker or isolated, Germany probably would have accepted diplomatic defeat rather than fight and Plan XVII would then have been unnecessary. Thus, Plan XVII was based on a contradiction like the Sdilieffen plan. It might have succeeded when it was unnecessary but was necessary when it was unlikely to succeed 11 . Although Plan XVII was unlikely to produce military success, it may have precluded political failure. By committing themselves to an immediate attack, the French committed the Russians to an eventual attack, i. e., to a protracted war against Germany. The Frendi would therefore not be isolated and need not surrender even if defeated. But immediate French surrender after defeat was a precondition for German success. Thus, Plan XVII's greatest significance was least expected. Designed for military victory, it prevented political defeat. Assuming a short war, it virtually insured a long one. Risking the Marne, it gained Tannenberg and the declaration of London. Disastrous strategy proved desirable policy. Like most alliances, the Franco-Russian alliance was interpreted selfishly and contradictorily by its adherents. French gain was Russian loss and Russian gain was French loss. If Germany concentrated against France, Russia could concentrate against Austria-Hungary; but, if Germany diverted considerable forces against Russia, France might break through the German front. In short, France and Russia made a calculated bargain: the Frendi paid for Tannenberg with the Ardennes, whereas the Russians paid for Lemberg with Tannenberg. The Russian interpretation served German interests better since it allowed Germany to con-centrate on France rather than fight an immediate two-front war. Likewise, the German interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian alliance served Russian interests better. To avoid sending large forces east, Germany sought to use AustriaHungary as a diversion for Russia. In effect, Germany let Russia concentrate on Austria-Hungary rather than fight an immediate two-front war. Thus, since Russia and Germany sought to convert potential two-front wars into one-front wars by using their allies as diversions, their immediate interests coincided. Conversely, Austro-Hungarian and Frendi interests coincided. Their positions were in many ways analogous. Both were confronted with one-front wars whidi threatened their great power status. Their decline as great powers had been accelerated by defeats at the hands of Germany. Since their revival required victory over a genuine great power, eadi wanted its ally to concentrate against this great power: France wanted Russia to concentrate against Germany, while Austria-Hungary wanted Germany to concentrate against Russia. Eadi devalued the other as a threat to its ally: France dismissed the Austro-Hungarian threat to Russia, while Austria-Hungary minimized the Frendi threat to Germany. Although eadi was refused by its ally and therefore compelled to meet its opponent largely alone, both committed themselves to risky offensives in order to insure even minimal assistance from their allies. These offensives were bad strategy since they increased the likelihood of defeat. But they proved good policy since they made future aid from their allies more likely. Thus, Austria-Hungary and France sought to avoid political defeat by risking military defeat. In the final analysis, France and Austria-Hungary gained more than Russia and Germany from their respective alliances. Russian and German strategies were caught in similar syndromes. Russian success depended on the rapid surrender of Austria-Hungary, while German success depended on the rapid surrender of France. But the prospect of future aid virtually insured against rapid AustroHungarian or Frendi surrender. The German commitment to Austria-Hungary precluded Russian victory and the Russian commitment to France precluded German victory. Thus, the preconditions for Russian and German military success obviated their political success, whereas the risk of Austro-Hungarian and Frendi military failure reduced the likelihood of political failure. All the European great powers were therefore caught in a vicious cycle. Although the assumption of a short war was basic to the decisions for war and the military plans, the alliance system virtually precluded a short war. A short war would have been possible only if the alliance system had desisted. But war broke out because the system had persisted. Thus, it was unlikely to be short. * * * Events demonstrated that an escape from this syndrome was virtually nonexistent. The short-war assumption implied the necessity of winning the initiative. Consequently, the operative military question during the first weeks of the war was whether the Franco-Russian alliance would break into central Europe or the Austro-German alliance would break out. This struggle for initiative caused a mania to mobilize. Mobilization involved political and military aspects. Despite prewar governmental anxieties, political obstacles to mobilization did not materialize. Likewise, the tedinical military aspects of mobilization ran relatively smoothly in all countries. In short, governments had greatest success in areas where they were least confident. But they were least correct in what they were most confident, namely the effects of mobilization on subsequent military events.
The powers mobilized and concentrated at different rates: the French would attack the Germans first, the Russians would attack the Germans first, and the Austro-Hungarians would attack the Russians first. Because they were expected, these rapid attacks were prepared for and produced no long-run advantages. On the contrary, all were terribly expensive, reinforced enemy strategy, and allowed the enemy to win the initiative in subsequent operations. Thus, the military advantages of rapid mobilization proved as illusory as the short-war assumption on which it was based. The French won and lost the initiative first. They concentrated with the objectives of breaking through the German center to secure a foothold on the Rhine and of isolating the German forces advancing through Belgium. The calm with which the French commander, Joffre, regarded the German advance is explained neither by icy nerves nor stupidity (as later criticism implied) but by the conviction that German strategy served his purpose by weakening the German center. Although initial attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, Joffre ordered his major attack (on 21 August) in the expectation that the German center had been depleted. In actual fact, the German center had superiority because it had been reinforced in expectation of the French attack. Joffre recognized (on the 24th) that his offensive had failed to break through the German front. He might nonetheless have persevered if he had had some prospect of success, aid from the Russians, and security on his flanks. Lacking these requirements, he diose to discontinue his attack and withdraw in order to preserve his forces. This decision was typical of choices made in similar circumstances during the early months of the war. The Belgians and British were doing the same at this time, the Russians would withdraw two weeks later after Tannenberg, as the Austro-Hungarians would do after Lemberg. At the same time, Joffre began to reinforce his left wing in order to meet the German advance. But a continued French attack against the German middle and German superiority on the west wing of both armies were essential if the Germans were to surround and annihilate the French army. Thus, Joffre's decisions virtually precluded German success 12 . German strategy now became the operative element. German dispositions had proceeded according to Sdilieffen's plan. After overcoming initial Belgian resistance, the German right wing advanced rapidly westward through Belgium until it had spread out along the Franco-Belgian border in preparation for its sweep southwestward through the northern Frendi plains in pursuit of the fleeing French and British. Although this pursuit stage of operations began with great optimism among German leaders, they soon recognized that the Frendi had not yet been defeated and were withdrawing in order. Despite rapid pursuit and success in several encounter battles, the Germans could not turn the Frendi flank as long as Joffre continued to withdraw 1S . Their rapid advance presented the Germans with a critical decision. As his right wing approadied Paris, Moltke, the German commander, was confronted with the choice of passing west or east of Paris. If he swung west of Paris, he would gain the advantage of including Paris in his net at the risk of a French breakthrough and isolation of his army west of Paris. Conversely, if he passed east of Paris, he would win the advantage of closing up his line and concentrating on the main French army at the risk of exposing his right flank to the Paris garrison. Moltke elected the alternative of moving east of Paris and defended against the danger from Paris by turning his right flank against it. He was frequently criticized for this decision but it is unlikely that it made a significant difference to the outcome of the campaign. In the Marne battle, the army of the German right (Kluck) met the army of the French left (Maunoury). Had Kluck passed west of Paris, he would merely have met Maunoury in different terrain and they would have been less critical to the Marne decision than they were. In fact, Moltke's decision to pass east of Paris may have proven an unexpected advantage to the Germans. By inducing the Frendi to discontinue their withdrawal and counter attack, it offered the Germans their one hypothetical diance to encircle the Anglo-French. In short, by risking military failure, the Germans improved the chances of military success 14 .
The battle of the Marne was a major turning point in military operations. It marked the end of the German pursuit, the farthest point of the German advance, and saved Paris 15 . But the critical question in evaluating the Marne is whether it reversed or merely revealed the course of events. It is traditionally perceived as a military miracle. The implication of this interpretation is that a German victory was likely and that Anglo-Frendi forces turned back superior German forces -otherwise it is illogical to describe the outcome as miraculous. This is an interpretation which was accepted by many German as well as Anglo-Frendi historians. For a generation after the war, German historians sought to make the Marne battle "come out right" by altering various details and decisions. The favorite scapegoats were Moltke and his envoy Hentsdi, who actually ordered the withdrawal of the German right wing 1β . This criticism is understandable but largely irrelevant. Although the commanders of the German right disputed Hentsdi's pressure to withdraw, few claimed that they could immediately resume the rapid advance which encircling the Anglo-Frendi required. The German army was simply too weak and exhausted to surround its opponents. The Marne was less a miracle than the natural result of the relative strength of opposing forces. German success during August had been deceptive. As long as the Frendi had concentrated their forces elsewhere, the German right wing could advance rapidly. But, when the Frendi shifted enough forces to give them superiority over the German west wing, the German advance ground to a halt 11 . The weakness of the German west wing has frequently been attributed to mistaken decisions. It is claimed that Moltke's decision to strengthen his left (southern) wing deprived his right (western) wing of the forces necessary to surround the Frendi 1β . Clearly, if the Germans had been vastly stronger at the Marne, they might have been able to threaten the Anglo-French with encirclement. But several considerations argue against this eventuality. Technical difficulties (particularly space and transportation facilities) reduced the possibility of strengthening the German west wing early in the campaign 19 . Had troops been shifted from the German left to right wing during the pursuit stage, it is likely that the French would have more than cancelled out any German advantage by shifting more troops more rapidly themselves 20 . In short, the Marne would have involved more troops but would probably have ended much as it did. It is also claimed that Moltke's diversion of troops elsewhere critically affected the Marne battle. His shipment of several corps to the eastern front was a mistake since it reduced the strength of his right wing and the troops arrived too late in the east to participate in the battle of Tannenberg 21 . But it is doubtful that they were sufficient to alter the Marne battle even if they had been sent to the right wing. Other German forces were involved in siege operations, above all against the Belgian forces in their sanctuary of Antwerp. These German forces would undoubtedly have been useful at the Marne -but so would the Belgian army. When the Germans expelled the Belgians from Antwerp in early October, the Germans gained both troops and artillery for their main operations. But the Belgian army was thereby forced bade into the Anglo-Frendi lines where it played an important role in the operations of October 22 . The net gain to the Germans therefore turned out to be only slight. In short, the criticism of German diversions cuts two ways. They probably reduced German forces at the Marne if it is assumed that they would have been sent there at the critical moment. But the allied forces opposing them might also have been larger. In the final analysis, such changes in the relative strength of forces at the Marne would probably not have altered the course of events fundamentally, i. e., allowed either side to encircle and annihilate the other. Meanwhile, events in the east made a rapid German victory even less likely. The Russians had mobilized more rapidly than the Germans had expected and attacked the Germans even before the Marne. The German victory at Tannenberg demonstrated what the preconditions were for success of the Sdilieffen plan. Only when the Russian army attacked the German middle and neglected its flanks were the Germans able to encircle and annihilate them. When during subsequent operations the Russians refused to attack the German middle and withdrew to protect their flanks, the Germans were unable to encircle them. In short, German success depended on very particular and exceptional Russian decisions. The importance of the Russian advance was not immediate relief for the French: the German forces withdrawn from the west were probably not critical to events at the Marne. But Tannenberg was undeniable proof that Russia was committed to the war against Germany. Since the Frendi could count on future if not im- The events of August and early September marked only the first German attempt to win a quick victory. It was not yet clearly impractical under existing conditions. The Marne could be misinterpreted as a mistake which might yet be rectified by sufficient German decisiveness. This is the basic assumption of criticism leveled against subsequent German strategy. It argues that the new German commander, Falkenhayn, was insufficiently decisive. He should have withdrawn rapidly after the Marne to regain the mobility necessary to shift forces to his right wing in order to turn the Anglo-French west flank 2e . Although Falkenhayn was undeniably indecisive, it is unlikely that greater decisiveness would have produced significantly different results -i. e., Anglo-Frendi encirclement. Like their opponents, the Germans lacked human and material resources to resume full scale operations. Falkenhayn was probably correct in his estimation that 2-3 weeks were necessary to repair these shortages even partially. Nonetheless, he did begin to shift forces to his west wing in preparation for resuming operations there 29 . The Germans made their second attempt to encircle and annihilate the Anglo-French during October and early November. The German offensive in Flanders began with the apparent prospect of success since the Germans enjoyed superiority at the outset. They actually achieved local successes and imposed serious strains on the Anglo-French-Belgian defenders. But the Germans were unable either to turn the enemy flank or to break through their front. As at the Marne, the explanation for this second German failure lies as much with the Anglo-French as with the Germans. Like the Germans, the Anglo-French had sought to turn their enemy's western flank. Since both sides had shifted forces of roughly similar size to the same area at the same time, neither could win and another stalemate resulted so . Only if one side had elected to attack the other's center and left its flank exposed might the other have encircled it. Thus, Entente decisions again precluded German success. Events in the east were similarly unpropitious for a rapid German victory. Like the opponents in the west, both sides in the east paused during the second half of September to recover from the initial operations and regroup for new offensives. After mutual recriminations, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans agreed on a combined attack against the flanks of the Russian forces in southern Poland 31 . The Anglo-French requested a rapid Russian attack but the Russians promised only a cautious advance S2 . Austro-German efforts to threaten the Russian flanks failed and superior Russian forces pushed the Austro-Germans out of Poland by the beginning of November 33 . This Russian advance into the Polish salient seemed to provide the Germans with another chance to win a smashing success. They sought to surround the Russian forces in nothern Poland but succeeded only in exposing themselves in turn to encirclement 34 . To avoid being outflanked again, the Russians withdrew in mid-December to central Poland and the front was stabilized in the east as it had been in the west 35 .
Like the stalemate in the west, the eastern military situation was a logical consequence of the strategy and strength of the belligerents. Both sides had chosen the conservative option when faced with the alternatives of victory at the risk of defeat and self-preservation at the risk of stalemate. In short, each had sacrificed victory to avoid defeat. The events on the eastern front not only precluded a smashing German victory but also made it even more unlikely that the French would surrender after military setbacks. Although the Russians had not advanced as rapidly as their allies had requested, these requests indicated that the AngloFrench still counted on future Russian assistance 3e . But Anglo-French hopes that Russia could produce a rapid Entente victory proved vain. The Russian advance was not even sufficiently threatening to force the Germans to alter their offensive against the Anglo-French in October 37 . In short, the Russians were too weak to produce Entente victory but strong enough to preclude Entente defeat. The generally expected short war proved an illusion. This eventuality was due less to chance events than to the policies and strategies of the great powers. The preconditions for a rapid German victory were the quick defeat and surrender of France. The Frendi army could be defeated rapidly only if surrounded and annihilated. It could be surrounded only if the Germans maneuvered around it and the French continued to attack the German center. When the French discontinued their attacks at the German center, withdrew in order and shifted forces to resist the advance of the German west wing, French encirclement and thus German success became highly unlikely. But, even if the French army had been encircled and annihilated, it was by no means certain that the French government would have surrendered. When the initial French attacks failed, the Frendi government proclaimed its determination to continue the war. Unlike 1870-1, France was not isolated and could count on future aid from Russia and Britain. In short, the conditions whidi had caused the July crisis to eventuate in war also virtually precluded a short war.
German strategy was therefore caught in a syndrome. It might have succeeded if the Entente had collapsed during the July crisis. But, if the Entente had collapsed, German strategy would not have been necessary. Thus, it might have succeeded when it was unnecessary but could not succeed when it was necessary. Germany was, however, not alone in this vicious cycle. None of the powers was able to win a quick war. Europe's experience at the beginning of World War I suggests that coalition wars which implicate an entire state system are unlikely to be short. But perhaps the belief in a short war is a necessary delusion. Without it, governments and peoples would find it difficult to begin total wars. 436, 470-1, 484-7, 490-2, 500, 510, 512-3; Frendi, 1914, pp. 305, 335, 337, 341-2; Asquith: Memories, II, p. 60; Lord Riddell: Lord Riddell's Diary, 1914 -1918 , London 1933 ; A. Pingaud: Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre, Paris, I, p. 124. 37 Weltkrieg, V, pp. 497-552.
